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What was the fastest military draft in the United States?

What was the fastest military draft in the United States?



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In the United States, men aged 18-25 are required to register for a possible military draft. The original argument was that the country would need large numbers of troops in a hurry, and (back then) there were otherwise no databases to locate eligible men.

In practice, troops don't magically appear on the combat field the day after a draft is declared. It takes time to notify possible recruits, confirm their eligibility, induct them, provide basic training, identify their aptitudes and skills, organize them into units, perform additional training specialized for their role, and transport them to a combat zone. Regular and reserve forces do the combat until conscripts are ready.

So, what was the shortest amount of time between when a military draft was announced, and when the first conscripts were deployed to a combat zone?


Clarification: I am principally interested in the answer applied to the United States / CSA; however, I can appreciate those respondents who may want to reach a wider audience. I have therefore removed the [united-states] tag, but ask that answers identify the applicable country.


Clarification #2: The question is specific to conscripts who have received zero training prior to recruitment. In other words, this excludes regular troops, reserves, and peacetime mandatory military service (e.g. the Israeli model).


In Thunder on the Danube, John H. Gill notes on page 95:

… Many of the conscripts called up by the September 1808 decrees only reached their depots in November and December. When they joined their regiments in Germany and Italy [in March 1809], therefore, they had only been in uniform for three or four months.

Two pages later (page 97) Gill then contrasts the state of the French Army with that in 1813, just four years later:

… , it must be stressed that this was fundamentally a sound force. If overall quality had declined somewhat… , in aggregate the army of 1809 remained far superior to the the courageous but raw conscript masses who marched into the 1813 campaign in Saxony.

These conscripts would see combat beginning in mid-April following the Austrian invasion of Bavaria on April 10. In Oudinot's Corps the conscripts would comprise about 70% of total manpower, while in Davout's III Corps they only comprised about 30% of total manpower. (Both figures according to Gill.) The cream of the 1809 class comprised the entirety of the newly created Young Guard, though with experienced officers and NCO's.

This timeline of about 14-18 weeks between arrival at depot and first combat was likely greater than in 1813 and 1814, but I have no quality resources for the latter two campaigns.


For the U.S.A. in particular, conscription has only been legislated six times; but the first five are all special cases that essentially rule out suitability as an answer here:

  • Revolutionary War - legislated but not enacted

  • War of 1812 - again legislated but not enacted

  • Civil War - legislated and enacted, but only a trivial number of conscripts were ever drafted: 2% plus 6% of paid substitute conscripts. All units throughout the war were predominantly filled with volunteers. There were never enough conscripts, used or required, to warrant any plan to train them.

  • World War One - The standing army was so tiny that Pershing, rightly, planned on training the trainers before training the soldiers. Pershing was also determined that U.S. troops (except for Black units that saw action under French command) would see action only as complete divisions under U.S. command.

    This resulted in basic training in the U.S. followed by an additional 6 months training /organizing in France before any units saw action. At no time was the actual training time for troops the limiting factor in speed of deployment; rather it was the training of the officer corps in large-scale unit maneuvers, with a planned completion in spring 1918, that was cut short slightly by the exigencies of the German Spring Offensive.

  • World War Two - Recognizing Pershing's dilemma from WW1, conscription was enacted in September 1940, in anticipation of an imminent need. Consequently by January 1942 a cadre of trained troops was already extant; it wouldn't be until late that summer, however, that other conditions were in place to support the offensives at Guadalcanal and North Africa.

    From the U.S. entry to the war until Operation Dragoon, the limiting factor for U.S. (and often Allied as well) troop deployment was constantly the limited availability of landing craft.

That only leaves Vietnam where conscription was the limiting factor for the initial deployment of conscripts. In 1966 the USMC reduced the length of boot camp from 11 weeks to 8 weeks, as well as increasing the size of the depot battalions, in order to meet troop demand.


Question: So, what was the shortest amount of time between when a military draft was announced, and when the first conscripts were deployed to a combat zone?

Short Answer:

9 days. August 4th 1863, a few Weeks after Gettysburg, Lincoln calls for the second Union draft of the civil war. Lincoln calls for 300,000 men for 9 months of service with quotas from each state remaining in the Union. Lincoln gives the states 11 days to fulfill their quota. Within 9 days on August 13th the first new regiments begins to march for Washington D.C.

Northern Draft of 1862
Aug. 13, 1863 the 110th N.Y. infantry departed for the capital Washington D.C (a front area).

Just 9 days after President Lincoln called for his second draft of the Civil War on August 4th 1863. Two days before the deadline of August 15th Lincoln associated with that draft.

Lincoln tried two call ups in 1863. The first in July failed, the second in August worked after Lincoln shortened the call up duration from 3 years to 9 months, agreed to pay a portion of the Federal bounty for volunteers up front (40$, then 25$ of the 100$ federal bounty, states and local counties also awarded these bounties which were compounded with conscripted men's funds and state and local governmental bounties, could total up to $1000 per man. Finally Lincoln threatened to fill the ranks with conscripted men from each state which failed to make the second quota. Both call ups, July and August, were called "drafts". see text of General Order No. 94 given below.

Some confusion about this draft may spring from the fact that both the entire call-up of 300,000 militia, and the subsequent filling of the deficiency in that call-up by conscription, are called a "draft."

1863, US Civil War saw Union troops regularly going into combat 3 weeks after getting called up. I found the above reference though to a regiment raised and deployed within 9 days, just weeks after the Battle of Gettysburg(July 1-3, 1863).

Detailed Answer:

The first wartime draft in American history where the draftee's actually saw combat was during the Civil War. The Enrollment Act, also known as the Civil War Military Draft Act, passed by congress in March 3, 1863, went into effect in July of that year and required all men 20-45 to register and be subject to the draft until the quota was met.

In the American Civil war there wasn't much training given to newly formed regiments. Many regiments went into combat only three weeks after being organized. They learned how to march and maneuver, some basic tactics and were thrown into battle.

Civil War Leadership: Discipline & Training of Soldiers
Rather than learning in training camp, Civil War regiments had to learn to fight on the battlefield. The training of regiments was lacking and consisted mainly of the manual of arms, little target practice, company and regimental drills in basic maneuvers and brigade drill and skirmishing tactics. Division drill or mock combat was a rare occurrence. Many regiments went into combat only three weeks after being organized.

Brigades were not combined into divisions until July 1861 or later, nor divisions into corps until the spring and summer of 1862. This means that no one, not even the officers had any experience fighting in such large numbers.


Pietr Geerkens
Civil War - legislated and enacted, but only a trivial number of conscripts were ever drafted: 2% plus 6% of paid substitute conscripts. All units throughout the war were predominantly filled with volunteers. There were never enough conscripts, used or required, to warrant any plan to train them.

.

It's irrelevant that only a small number of the Union Army were technically conscripted. The question makes no restriction on the percentage of draftees vs volunteers, just the duration between the draft being announced and how quickly they were placed in the field… Secondly that only a small amount of soldiers were drafted by Vietnam/modern standards isn't the same as saying the draft only accounted for a small number of soldiers. The Draft was designed to create more volunteers and the legislation was very successful in raising hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War. By James W. Geary.
After Congress passed the Enrollment Act in March 1863, all men aged twenty to forty-five became eligible for the draft. This act, Geary emphasizes, was an attempt at reigniting volunteer enlistments. Although all men between twenty and forty-five were eligible, only congressional districts that did not meet the quota for volunteers would then implement a draft lottery. Then, if drafted, the men would receive a medical and hardship examination. If he passed the draftee would have ten days to hire a substitute, to pay a three-hundred-dollar commutation fee, or to join the army. Geary shows that the ability to hire substitutes and the three-hundred-dollar commutation fee allowed the majority of all men drafted to stay home.

Draft bounties were paid by individual soldiers federal, state and local governments. They were all compounded.

. Cincinnati Civil War Round Table From the Draft Act of 1863 to the end of the war, there was a total of almost $600,000,000.00 paid out in enlistment bonuses and allowances. This included $286,000,000.00 from state funds and $300,000,000.00 from the federal government.

If you volunteered you could receive a bounty as high as $1000 for your service. If you didn't volunteer you ran the risk of being drafted and getting nothing. This was a carrot and stick measure designed to get people to volunteer and it was quite effective. Hundreds of thousands of union "volunteers" collected bounties for their service which was directly enabled by the Enrollment Act.

Here is the timeline…

  • March 3rd 1863, The Enrollment Act is passed by Congress, empowering the President to draft citizens into the Army.
  • July 2, 1863, Lincoln calls for the first Union Draft of the war, 300,000 men for 3 years, giving each state in the union a quota. The states ask for volunteers but get none. The call up fails.
  • August 4th, 1863, Lincoln has received almost none of his troops with the states claiming they had no regiments to provide. So Lincoln responds calling for new round of 300,000 men, but this time both cutting the time of service from 3 years to 9months, and further saying if his second call up is not provided by August 15th, 1863 (10 days) Lincoln will start drafting citizens from each state which has not met its quota. (both call ups were referred to as drafts, even though the effect was to inspire volunteers).

On Aug. 4, 1863 Lincoln called up 300,000 men for nine months service, on top of the 300,000 he had already requested in July for three years. The militia call-up was General Order No. 94:

Ordered:
I. That a draft of 300,000 militia be immediately called into the service of the United States, to serve for nine months unless sooner discharged. The Secretary of War will assign the quotas to the States and establish regulations for the draft.
.
II. That if any state shall not by the 15th of August furnish its quota of the additional 300,000 volunteers authorized by law, the deficiency of volunteers in that State will also be made up by special draft from the militia. The Secretary of War will establish regulations for this purpose.

.
Northern Draft of 1862

"It became quickly apparent that the draft was not intended as the primary source of man power," wrote a historian of the Union army. "Rather it was merely a whip to encourage volunteers."

.

"Thousands of our people are now offering themselves under the last call, and are demanding they shall not be drafted," Adjt.-Gen. Allen C. Fuller of Illinois wrote to Stanton on Aug. 7. Finnell, the military governor of Kentucky, was delighted. "Enlistments are greatly facilitated by the draft," he wrote to the War Department on Aug. 7.
.
The imminent threat of the draft swelled the recruiting, and the fresh blue-clad ranks began to flow toward the front: the 110th N.Y. infantry departed for the capital on Aug. 13, (9 days after Lincoln made his second call up)… the 122nd and 129th Pennsylvania arrived in Washington on Aug. 16; the 18th Connecticut rode through New York City on Aug. 23; the 11th N.J. regiment departed the state Aug. 25; the 36th Massachusetts left Worcester on Sept. 3, and so on.

Occurring weeks after Lincoln announced the second draft on August 4th 1863, went into effect the first wave of men were marching through Washington… Washington in August 1863 a month after the Battle of Gettysburg, was a front staging area of the Civil War.

Sources:

  • Enrollment Act
  • Civil War Leadership: Discipline & Training of Soldiers
  • Northern Draft of 1862
  • America's First Wartime Draft
  • Cincinnati Civil War Round Table
  • We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War. By James W. Geary.

Final Draft

Forty years ago Sunday — on January 27, 1973, the same day the United States signed the Paris Accords ending its involvement in the Vietnam War — then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced that "the Armed Forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines." This communiqué ended the draft, and ushered in the era of America’s all-volunteer military.

Four decades later, the costs of that decision have come into greater relief. Even with the all-volunteer force, issues of equity and burden-sharing persist. Without the forced march of each generation through military service, the civil-military divide has grown, shaped by self-selection and labor market dynamics. Arguably, the all-volunteer force has made us more likely to use force abroad, by eliminating conscription as a major source of dissent and decoupling the military from most people. And, although it pays the current force well, the United States pays too little attention to signs of stress like military suicides, recruiting and retention woes, and post-discharge employment struggles. If we want to continue to rely on an all-volunteer military, we must do better to serve our troops as well as they serve us.

Both conscription and today’s large volunteer force are historical anomalies. For most of the nation’s history, we have relied upon a relatively small military, manned (it was almost all men until only recently) almost exclusively by volunteers, as Jim Wright explains in his excellent history of the nation’s veterans. Conscription was used sparingly during the Revolutionary War, and then again for the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the Cold War period ending in 1973. This model of a small volunteer force, interrupted by conscription during major wars, changed at the end of World War II, with the United States for the first time developing a large permanent military filled with a mix of conscripts and volunteers.

However, this manpower machine broke down during Vietnam. Conscription fanned dissent against the war, and discipline and effectiveness crumbled throughout the force. The desire to end the draft for political reasons, and the military’s concerns about efficacy, found a receptive audience in the Nixon administration, including among senior advisors like economist Milton Friedman, who believed an all-volunteer force would be more compatible with the nation’s market economy than a conscript one. The Nixon administration convened a high-powered commission on the subject, and used the end of the war to end the draft and create the military we know today.

The all-volunteer force (or what some experts call the "recruited force," because of the role enlistment incentives play in attracting volunteers) solved some of the problems associated with conscription, but not all of them. The question of "who serves when not all serve" remains a pressing one, particularly during time of war, when less than 1 percent of Americans serve on active duty or in the reserves. And it remains unclear whether our nation can make sound strategic decisions unless there is a more direct and personal connection between the Army, the people, and the state — and particularly between the military and civilian elites.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars have also tested the viability of the all-volunteer force. At the height of the Iraq war, the Army struggled to fill its ranks, with some (including me) suggesting that it was ahistorical and hugely inefficient to generate military manpower for protracted war without conscription. Most of the military’s current personnel and readiness problems — including suicides, combat stress, and financial difficulties for servicemembers — relate in some way to the decision to use a small volunteer force and cycle it through multiple deployments, rather than raise a large conscription-based army to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, many issues relating to the use (or overuse) of the reserves, and reliance on private contractors, trace back to decisions to fight the last 12 years of war with a small active force.

Some of these stresses will subside after the wars end, but larger questions about the force’s sustainability will remain. Manpower costs — including pay, benefits, healthcare, and housing — represent the fastest growing part of the Pentagon budget. Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine general who chairs the Reserve Forces Policy Board, has famously quipped that the Defense Department is on track to become a benefits company that occasionally kills a terrorist. The current pay and benefits structure has grown over the past 40 years, and today reflects the need for generous compensation to recruit and retain a force in wartime, as well as the political value of financially supporting the troops. However, its sustainability, like many other parts of the Pentagon budget, has been called into question. The nation can probably afford a smaller force with the current package, or it can afford the current force with lesser compensation (and fewer deployments, too), but it likely can’t afford both. The Pentagon must wrestle with these questions during its 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and develop better options than the status quo for the president and Congress to consider, such as rebalancing the mixture of active and reserve forces, and addressing the mixture of service members, civilians, and contractors the force relies upon.

As the military evolves, so too will the veteran population. Over the next 30 years, the large conscription-based cohorts of the Cold War and Vietnam War will fade away, giving way to a population that is smaller, more dispersed, and more diverse in terms of age, race, and sex than previous generations of veterans. Based on current utilization and claims rates among post-9/11 veterans, the future veteran population will also place much higher demands on the Department of Veterans Affairs. This will extend the cost of military service for decades to come, and add trillions of dollars to the ultimate bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The VA has begun planning for this reality, but it must do more, adapting its benefits models, healthcare models, and physical infrastructure to serve the veterans of the future.

The federal government should not do this alone. Thousands of veterans organizations have sprung up over the past 12 years of war. However, these agencies and groups too often duplicate each other’s efforts, act ineffectively, or worse, take funds that would be better spent elsewhere. We need a new business model for the broader community that serves veterans — one that measures performance and rewards those who produce tangible, measurable results.

With the Iraq war over, the Afghanistan war ending, and the nation entering an age of fiscal austerity, the United States will face an array of hard choices about how to best support and sustain the all-volunteer force and its veterans. To begin with, America needs a national strategy to address the needs of the veterans and military community — to set goals and priorities, and assign agencies, budgets, and personnel to meet those objectives. This strategy must balance our commitments to those who serve with our national resources and means to pay for those commitments. We must also use the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review process, and others like it, to make hard choices about military manpower and force structure. We can no longer rely on wartime excess to conceal the very real tradeoffs between people, hardware, operations, and other parts of our national security enterprise. And if we are to maintain the all-volunteer force model, one which asks so little of our nation but so much of our volunteers, we must find a better model for making decisions about where, when, and why to send our nation’s sons and daughters to war.

Forty years ago Sunday — on January 27, 1973, the same day the United States signed the Paris Accords ending its involvement in the Vietnam War — then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced that "the Armed Forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines." This communiqué ended the draft, and ushered in the era of America’s all-volunteer military.

Four decades later, the costs of that decision have come into greater relief. Even with the all-volunteer force, issues of equity and burden-sharing persist. Without the forced march of each generation through military service, the civil-military divide has grown, shaped by self-selection and labor market dynamics. Arguably, the all-volunteer force has made us more likely to use force abroad, by eliminating conscription as a major source of dissent and decoupling the military from most people. And, although it pays the current force well, the United States pays too little attention to signs of stress like military suicides, recruiting and retention woes, and post-discharge employment struggles. If we want to continue to rely on an all-volunteer military, we must do better to serve our troops as well as they serve us.

Both conscription and today’s large volunteer force are historical anomalies. For most of the nation’s history, we have relied upon a relatively small military, manned (it was almost all men until only recently) almost exclusively by volunteers, as Jim Wright explains in his excellent history of the nation’s veterans. Conscription was used sparingly during the Revolutionary War, and then again for the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the Cold War period ending in 1973. This model of a small volunteer force, interrupted by conscription during major wars, changed at the end of World War II, with the United States for the first time developing a large permanent military filled with a mix of conscripts and volunteers.

However, this manpower machine broke down during Vietnam. Conscription fanned dissent against the war, and discipline and effectiveness crumbled throughout the force. The desire to end the draft for political reasons, and the military’s concerns about efficacy, found a receptive audience in the Nixon administration, including among senior advisors like economist Milton Friedman, who believed an all-volunteer force would be more compatible with the nation’s market economy than a conscript one. The Nixon administration convened a high-powered commission on the subject, and used the end of the war to end the draft and create the military we know today.

The all-volunteer force (or what some experts call the "recruited force," because of the role enlistment incentives play in attracting volunteers) solved some of the problems associated with conscription, but not all of them. The question of "who serves when not all serve" remains a pressing one, particularly during time of war, when less than 1 percent of Americans serve on active duty or in the reserves. And it remains unclear whether our nation can make sound strategic decisions unless there is a more direct and personal connection between the Army, the people, and the state — and particularly between the military and civilian elites.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars have also tested the viability of the all-volunteer force. At the height of the Iraq war, the Army struggled to fill its ranks, with some (including me) suggesting that it was ahistorical and hugely inefficient to generate military manpower for protracted war without conscription. Most of the military’s current personnel and readiness problems — including suicides, combat stress, and financial difficulties for servicemembers — relate in some way to the decision to use a small volunteer force and cycle it through multiple deployments, rather than raise a large conscription-based army to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, many issues relating to the use (or overuse) of the reserves, and reliance on private contractors, trace back to decisions to fight the last 12 years of war with a small active force.

Some of these stresses will subside after the wars end, but larger questions about the force’s sustainability will remain. Manpower costs — including pay, benefits, healthcare, and housing — represent the fastest growing part of the Pentagon budget. Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine general who chairs the Reserve Forces Policy Board, has famously quipped that the Defense Department is on track to become a benefits company that occasionally kills a terrorist. The current pay and benefits structure has grown over the past 40 years, and today reflects the need for generous compensation to recruit and retain a force in wartime, as well as the political value of financially supporting the troops. However, its sustainability, like many other parts of the Pentagon budget, has been called into question. The nation can probably afford a smaller force with the current package, or it can afford the current force with lesser compensation (and fewer deployments, too), but it likely can’t afford both. The Pentagon must wrestle with these questions during its 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and develop better options than the status quo for the president and Congress to consider, such as rebalancing the mixture of active and reserve forces, and addressing the mixture of service members, civilians, and contractors the force relies upon.

As the military evolves, so too will the veteran population. Over the next 30 years, the large conscription-based cohorts of the Cold War and Vietnam War will fade away, giving way to a population that is smaller, more dispersed, and more diverse in terms of age, race, and sex than previous generations of veterans. Based on current utilization and claims rates among post-9/11 veterans, the future veteran population will also place much higher demands on the Department of Veterans Affairs. This will extend the cost of military service for decades to come, and add trillions of dollars to the ultimate bill for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The VA has begun planning for this reality, but it must do more, adapting its benefits models, healthcare models, and physical infrastructure to serve the veterans of the future.

The federal government should not do this alone. Thousands of veterans organizations have sprung up over the past 12 years of war. However, these agencies and groups too often duplicate each other’s efforts, act ineffectively, or worse, take funds that would be better spent elsewhere. We need a new business model for the broader community that serves veterans — one that measures performance and rewards those who produce tangible, measurable results.

With the Iraq war over, the Afghanistan war ending, and the nation entering an age of fiscal austerity, the United States will face an array of hard choices about how to best support and sustain the all-volunteer force and its veterans. To begin with, America needs a national strategy to address the needs of the veterans and military community — to set goals and priorities, and assign agencies, budgets, and personnel to meet those objectives. This strategy must balance our commitments to those who serve with our national resources and means to pay for those commitments. We must also use the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review process, and others like it, to make hard choices about military manpower and force structure. We can no longer rely on wartime excess to conceal the very real tradeoffs between people, hardware, operations, and other parts of our national security enterprise. And if we are to maintain the all-volunteer force model, one which asks so little of our nation but so much of our volunteers, we must find a better model for making decisions about where, when, and why to send our nation’s sons and daughters to war.


The U.S. Army's 5 Most Lethal Weapons of War

When it comes to lethal weapons, the U.S. Army has no shortage. Some may be too expensive, some too complex and others may be desired by politicians and defense contractors, but not the troops on the field.

Nonetheless, today's U.S. Army can generate an astonishing amount of firepower and deliver it in a variety of settings from small-war counterinsurgency to big-war mechanized combat. With that in mind, here are five of the best U.S. Army weapons:

AH-64 Apache:

Ironic it is that the best weapon of America's premier land force is an aircraft. But given the conflicts the U.S. military has recently fought and is likely to fight, airpower is the most decisive factor.

Equipped with a 30-millimeter cannon, Hellfire missiles and sophisticated sensors, the Apache combines speed, firepower and range that allows the Army to strike enemies long before they come within firing distance of Army ground troops. It is equally useful at hunting down insurgents or decimating enemy armored columns. The Apache has fought well in conflicts from Desert Storm to the current Afghan war.

Perhaps more important, the Apache is airpower that the Army itself controls, rather than having to rely on the Air Force or Navy aircraft for close air support. An attack helicopter is not, and will never be, a substitute for infantry on the ground. But the ground troops will appreciate the support an attack helicopter can provide.

Whether the M-1 Abrams is the best tank in the world depends on who you talk to, and more important, what country they are from. But it is indisputably among the world's best.

Weighing in at 60 tons, the M-1A2 has a 120-millimeter cannon, depleted-uranium armor up to three feet thick and a top speed of more than 40 miles per hour. It decimated Iraq's Soviet-made armor in 1991, and quite possibly would do the same to China's advanced Type 99 tank. Very few Abrams have been destroyed in combat the fact that ISIS has destroyed or captured Iraqi government M-1s says more about the quality of the crews than the tank.

M-109A6 Paladin:

The U.S. Army's hard-hitting, self-propelled howitzers have taken a backseat in America's recent small wars. Nonetheless, they remain highly potent weapons.

The Paladin is the latest version of the venerable M-109 self-propelled gun. It can shoot a 155-millimeter shell up to 20 miles using rocket-assisted projectiles. It can also fire the GPS- or laser-guided Excalibur shell.

TOW Anti-Tank Missile:

Russia (or the Soviet Union) seems to be the king of anti-tank missiles, though this probably reflects the pattern of arms sales, as well as how great a threat Western-designed armor posed to Russia and its clients. So it is easy to forget that the U.S. Army is no slouch, either, at the anti-tank missile game.

The Army's TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) anti-tank missile is still going strong after nearly forty-five years of service. It has destroyed tanks—mostly Russian—in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Iran-Iraq War and now Syria. The newer TOW 2B comes in several versions, including a bunker-busting missile, as well as the Aero model, which explodes above a tank to penetrate its thin top armor.

M-2 .50-Caliber Machine Gun:

It may sound strange to classify an eighty-year-old machine gun as one of the Army's best weapons. But the fact the M-2 "Ma Deuce" is still blasting away after nearly a century and countless wars is testament to the fact that it is a remarkable gun.

Developed when Franklin Roosevelt had just become president and Hitler was just taking power in Germany, the M-2 has seen service all over the world as an anti-aircraft, anti-vehicle and anti-personnel machine gun that's closer in power to a small cannon. A recently upgraded version, the M2A1, features a quick-change barrel and a night flash suppressor.

Michael Peck is a contributing writer at Foreign Policy Magazine and a writer for the War is Boring defense blog. Follow him on Twitter: @Mipeck1.


SR-71 Blackbird Sets London-to-L.A. Speed Record

At the height of the Cold War, Lockheed’s Skunk Works designed an airplane that would prove to be the greatest photoreconnaissance aircraft ever built. The SR-71 Blackbird could fly through any airspace in the world with near impunity. It flew so high and fast that even surface-to-air missiles were largely ineffective against it. This Mach 3-plus jet was designed and built by Lockheed’s genius Kelly Johnson and his staff.

On December 22, 1964, Lockheed test pilot Robert J. Gilliland took the Black­bird up for its first flight. During the 56-minute test, he clocked speeds of Mach 1.5 at 46,000 feet, which at the time was unheard of for any new aircraft’s initial flight. This was an indicator of the po­tential the Blackbird would realize with the U.S. Air Force.

It took close to a year to iron out all the kinks, but in January 1966 the first SR-71 entered USAF service. The first mission-capable Blackbird was delivered to Beale Air Force Base in northern California in early April of that year. These high-flying supersonic aircraft would carry out their worldwide mission for the next 25 years before being forced into retirement by budget cuts.

As the Vietnam War heated up, so did the SR-71’s workload. In 1968 it began operations over North Vietnam and Laos, averaging about one sortie per week until 1970, when the schedule was bumped up to two sorties per week, then maxed out at a sortie every day in 1972. The intel gathered during these flights was invaluable, and no Blackbirds were lost to enemy action. Speed, altitude and stealth were major factors in keeping the SR-71 safe because Hanoi was ringed with the latest SAMs provided by the Soviets.

The 1970s proved to be the most noteworthy period for the high-Mach Blackbird. On September 1, 1974, Major James Sullivan and his backseater, Major Noel F. Widdifield, set a speed record in SR-71A serial no. 64-17972, flying from New York to London in 1 hour 54 minutes and 56 seconds, for an average speed of 1,806.96 mph. Less than two weeks later, the same airplane made a long-distance sprint from London to Los Angeles in record time. The pilot on that flight, 31-year-old Captain Harold B. “Buck” Adams, had at age 28 become the youngest airman to fly the SR-71. His reconnaissance systems officer was Major William C. Machorek. Their historic September 13 flight would stretch across seven time zones and take almost twice as long as the New York–to–London dash.


Adams and Machorek greet the Farnborough crowd after their record breaking flight. (U.S. Air Force)

Captain Adams flew in the SR-71 program for four years and accumulated about 350 to 400 hours in the Black­bird. He also piloted B-52 bombers during the Vietnam War, logging 137 combat missions over Southeast Asia between the two aircraft. After he was deployed to Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in North Carolina following the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, he flew one of his most memorable SR-71 missions—a 10-hour 20-minute round trip to the Middle East requiring five aerial refuelings—for which he and his backseater were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

The story of the record-breaking London–Los Angeles flight began after the September 1 New York–London run, when no. 972 was put on display at the Farnborough International Airshow. This is one of the biggest annual airshows in the world, with all the major air forces participating in some way, usually with their newest and most sophisticated aircraft.

Adams, who retired from the Air Force as a brigadier general in 1992, recalled the events that led up to the record flight: “Senator Barry Goldwater, a two-star general in the reserves, had previously flown in an SR-71, and he convinced President [Gerald R.] Ford to send the aircraft to England to put it on display to demonstrate American technology. That’s when we got the go-ahead for the mission. Our wing commander picked two flight crews, and I was lucky enough to be the pilot on the return flight.

“Mission preparation for the record flight was pretty straightforward. We just sat down in the briefing and went over suit time, start time, taxi time, launch time, etc. We also covered details of the flight route itself and all the events that we could expect along that route. So we had the frequencies of the tankers that we would have to talk to, ground control, flight path so that if we lost an engine and had to abort the mission we would know where to go. This was all standard procedure on any mission you flew in the Blackbird.”

After the Farnborough show came to a close, 972 was transferred to RAF Mildenhall, where the ground crews made final preparations for its flight back to the States. On the morning of September 13, the weather over Britain was perfect, and takeoff was right on time. As was routine for any Blackbird mission, the crew took off with a light load of fuel and then met up with the first tanker off the northeast tip of the country.

“Once we left Mildenhall we flew southeast, turned and came across London going northeast at the timing gate [the beginning of the official time recorded for the speed record],” recalled Adams. “The first 53 minutes of the mission were all subsonic because we flew up off the coast and refueled with three tankers, and then accelerated to altitude. We could not go supersonic over England.

“If we had taken off from Mildenhall, picked up a tanker and then moved up to altitude and hit our max speed immediately and gone across the timing gate at Mach 3-plus over London, we could have cut our flight time by 48 minutes,” Adams said. “We crossed the Atlantic Ocean at Mach 3.2, which equates to about 2,200 mph. We did the Great Circle route from the UK, crossed the North American coast over Newfoundland and descended from 80,000 feet to 25,000 feet to meet up with three more tankers, one of which was a spare. We filled our tank and then began accelerating back up to our optimum altitude. We began to encounter some very strong headwinds—100 knots—in the refueling track, which chewed up some valuable time, so I started the acceleration sooner than planned to reduce the effect of the headwind.”

The streaking Blackbird entered the United States just south of the Great Lakes. Adams said he and Machorek had agreed to radio Gen­eral Russell Dougherty, commander of the Strategic Air Command, as they passed over the Midwest. When they were near SAC’s command post in Omaha, Neb., they gave him a call and updated him on their expected arrival time in Los Angeles.


Adams and Machorek land 972 at the 1974 Farnborough Airshow after setting the first of two records. (U.S. Air Force)

“At that time, we had every intention of setting a world speed record,” Adams explained. “As we approached California, we started to decelerate so we would be subsonic by the time we got to the mountain range on the east side of Los Angeles. We then went all the way to the coast, which was several minutes of flight to LAX because they had a radar timing gate there. We flew through it, and then we knew we had completed the mission successfully and they had confirmed the time.”

The total time for the record flight was 3 hours, 47 minutes and 39 seconds. Adams and Machorek had covered nearly 5,447 miles at an average speed of 1,435.59 mph.

“We turned around and headed back over the mountains out to the desert,” continued Adams, “and met up with the tanker, where we picked up 30,000 pounds of fuel. Then we flew up to Beale AFB, where we did a couple of flyovers and landed. Needless to say, the press was there, along with a sizable crowd.”

Although the London–L.A. flight came off without a hitch, and Adams said any one of many pilots could have flown the mission, he also noted: “I could never say that flying the SR-71 was uneventful, especially when you’re in an aircraft that can travel one mile in 1.8 seconds! Both crew members have to be constantly alert to make sure everything is performing the way it should. While we did set a speed record, I feel that all the support people who participated in making this happen should be recognized for the outstanding job they did.

“The real heroes of the SR-71 story are the Lockheed Skunk Works designers and engineers who built a phenomenal aircraft that could exceed Mach 3 and withstand 1,200 degrees F, and the maintenance crews that kept that magnificent bird in the air,” concluded Adams.

For further reading, frequent contributor Warren Thompson recommends: Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions, by Paul F. Crick­more, and Lockheed SR-71/YF-12 Blackbirds, by Dennis R. Jenkins.

Click here to view an Aviation History animation and watch the SR-71 Blackbird come to life.


7. Lockheed F-104 Starfighter

The Lockheed F-104 Starfighter is a single-engine, supersonic interceptor aircraft originally developed by Lockheed for the United States Air Force (USAF). It was operated by the air forces of more than a dozen nations from 1958 to 2004.

A total of 2,578 Starfighters were produced, mostly by NATO members. The poor safety record of the Starfighter brought the aircraft into the public eye, especially in German Air Force service. The F-104 was also at the center of the Lockheed bribery scandals, in which Lockheed had given bribes to a considerable number of political and military figures in various nations in order to influence their judgment and secure several purchase contracts this caused considerable political controversy in Europe and Japan.

Performance

  • Maximum speed: 1,530 mph (2,137 km/h, Mach 2.01)
  • Combat radius: 420 miles (670 km)
  • Ferry range: 1,630 miles (2,623 km)
  • Service ceiling: 50,000 ft (15,000 m)
  • Rate of climb: 48,000 ft/min (244 m/s)

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The Navy, meanwhile, reported the lowest incidence rate of cumulative injuries. How much of that could be related to inactivity was not determined.

A staggering number of troops are fat and tired, report says

Glaring concerns over weight and sleep issues for military personnel were raised in a 2018 RAND report.

Rates of obesity were configured using the oft-criticized body mass index measure, which indicates a service member is obese if their BMI reads 30 or higher.

“This report highlights obesity as a growing health concern among Sailors,” the study’s authors commented about their findings, which were first reported by Stars and Stripes.

“Obesity contributes to hypertension, diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, cancer, all-cause mortality, and increased healthcare costs.”

It also costs the DoD significant coin.

“The Department of Defense, our nation’s largest employer, spends about $1.5 billion annually in obesity-related health care costs for current and former service members and their families, as well as costs to replace unfit personnel,” a recent study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention claimed.

Overweight and obese active duty military also cost DoD $103 million per year in the form of 658,000 lost workdays, the study found.

“In the civilian world, unfit or overweight employees can impact the bottom line,” retired Air Force Gen. Richard E. Hawley said in the CDC study. "But in our line of work, lives are on the line and our national security is at stake.

The civilian world is one in which, as of 2015, one in three young adults are considered too fat to enlist, contributing to a difficult-to-navigate environment for recruiters in finding suitable candidates for military service.

A 2018 RAND Report that analyzed rates of both obese and overweight troops painted a grim picture of the military’s physical fitness standards.

The study, featuring roughly 18,000 randomly selected participants across each of the service branches, reported that almost 66 percent of service members are considered to be either overweight or obese, based on the same BMI measurement standard used in the DoD study.

Broken down by service, the 2018 report lists the Army as the branch accounting for the highest percentage of overweight troops, with 69.4 percent of soldiers falling under this category.

The Army was followed by the Coast Guard (67.8 percent), Navy (64.6 percent), Air Force (63.1 percent) and Marine Corps (60.9 percent).

“If we don’t take steps now to build a strong, healthy foundation for our young people, then it will not just be our military that pays the price," retired Rear Adm. Richard R. Jeffries said in the CDC study.


1 Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird (2,500 mph)

And the winner is the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird — yes it's not a fighter jet but still the fastest military aircraft. This was a long-range, high-altitude, strategic reconnaissance aircraft developed back in the 1960s and saw service in both the US Air Force and with NASA. 32 of these super fast and advanced jets were produced, and they have all since been retired.

Ironic that the fastest military aircraft was designed back in the 1960s and are not in service today. Today stealth is more important than just plain speed.

In summary, the Russians have the world's fastest fighter jets, but the Americans have the stealthiest.

Here is everything we know about the 2022 Honda City Hatchback.

Aaron is best known for his dad jokes and his tendency to hitchhike around the world. Hailing from New Zealand, you just never know where this wandering Kiwi will turn up (occasionally its actually New Zealand). While Aaron may have graduated in accounting, it soon became clear that a more outdoorsy and adventurous lifestyle is what would suit him. He has a flare for writing and has taught English around the world for years. A nerd, he is always interesting in researching different topics of interest including the past and the future history of English.


Top 10 Best U.S.A Fighter Jets

Fighter jets, or aircrafts, have been essential in the battlefield since World War I. These war equipments were viewed as the secret key for victory, although they cannot be used in battles as the only attacking weapons there has to be ground-attack techniques as well. Aircrafts provide great assist, which is why every military always seeks air supremacy. The efficiency of a fighter jet is determined by several factors such as speed, size, maneuverability and definitely the skillfulness of its pilot. Being the top military, the USA possesses some of the world’s best aircrafts. Here’s their best 10 fighter jets.

10 A/V-8B Harrier II

Here’s a McDonnell Douglas’ aircraft, known as AV-8B Harrier II. It has a single engine as well as two seats, and is designed for ground attacking. This fighter jet performs both vertical and short takeoffs and landing. AV-8B Harrier was first created in the late 70’s. Its main purposes are air support, defending the ground soldiers and light attacks. It was used by the Navy of several nations, besides the United States, such as Spain and Italy.


Air Force Reveals the Fastest Military Supercomputer Known as “Condor Cluster”

In 2010, the United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) revealed its newest system, which is made out of 1760 Sony PlayStation 3(PS3) consoles. It is recognized as the world’s fastest interactive computer system in the entire Department of Defense (DoD), which is capable of executing 500 trillion floating-point operations per second (500 TFLOPS)

This Project began some years ago, and during that time, the PlayStation 3 supercomputer consoles cost around $599 each, and at the same time, other technologies cost around $10,000 per unit. And the overall air force supercomputer’s core costs about $2 million. And according to AFRL’s report, the condor cluster’s total cost is 5 % – 10% compared to other technologies.

This Condor Cluster, the array has a pack of 168 GPUs and 84 servers to direct traffic within the system, allowing all that power to work in parallel. One of this project’s major advantages is that it consumes just 10 percent of the power and the total cost is about $2 million.

In 2011 the United States Air Force Research Laboratory Built the Condor Cluster.

This ps4 supercomputer cluster is now located in Rome, New York, formally presented at a ribbon-cutting ceremony. The airforce centers across the country will use this PlayStation 3 supercomputer to assign tasks like radar enhancement, pattern recognition, artificial intelligence, and satellite imagery processing.

This air force PS3 supercomputer has better features hence its speed allows it to examine the ultra-high-resolution images very quickly( at a rate of billion pixels per minute). This type of air force supercomputers can greatly reduce the amount of time. With its video game consoles cutting-edge graphics technology, this military supercomputer has a better algorithm that can identify the blurred flying objects in space.

The reason behind choosing PS3 consoles to build a supercomputer was cost-efficiency. The newer versions don’t allow for the installation of Linux, but the older version of PS3 does. But this feature was removed later due to security issues. Before the Air Force Ps3 supercomputer, a group in North Carolina built a PS3 supercomputer in 2007.


This airman is the fastest long distance runner in the Air Force

Air Force Airman 1st Class Daniel Kirwa competes in the 2019 Armed Forces Cross Country Championship and simultaneously the 2019 USA Track and Field Cross Country Championship in Tallahassee, Fl. Feb. 2, 2019. (DoD photo by EJ Hersom) ( Defense.gov )

Meet Airman 1st Class Daniel Kirwa, the Air Force’s fastest long distance runner.

Kirwa, a medical technician with the 6th Healthcare Operations Squadron at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, ran almost 180 miles a week in preparation for the Air Force Marathon at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio on Sept. 21, 2019.

Among those competing in the military category, Kirwa placed first — earning bragging rights as the service’s fastest long distance runner. Out of all participants, he placed third.

“I was so excited when I finished the race because I represented the Air Force nicely, which was my main goal,” said Kirwa, 32, according to a MacDill news release. “It was a very challenging race, but it felt good to represent something bigger than myself.”

Kirwa’s daily training for the marathon started at 4 a.m. when he would wake up to get in an early morning for about an hour. After work, he would clock another, even longer run lasting about two hours.

“The last month before the marathon, I would run 10 miles in the morning before work and between 18 and 20 in the evening,” Kirwa said. “I would do that for six days and take a day break.”

Running has been a part of Kirwa’s daily routine since he was a child. Kirwa, originally from Kenya, would run a total of six miles each day to attend school as a child. An additional three to six miles each day were added on top of that when he joined the high school track team.

He continued running during his college career when he earned a full scholarship to attend Harding University. As a college athlete, Kirwa won four NCAA Division II National Championship titles in multiple track and cross country events.

“When I run, I just think,” Kirwa said. “I reflect on how I started my journey, how far I’ve come, and the people that have helped me along the way.”

Kirwa has no intention of slowing down either. His Air Force Marathon time — 2 hours, 33 minutes, and 3 seconds — is just minutes above the 2 hours and 19 minutes required to qualify for the Olympics.

Kirwa said he is going to continue to push his physical limits and is now training to cut his time so he can fulfill his childhood dream to run in the Olympics.

“My goal for the Air Force Marathon was to run 2 hours, 28 minutes but my end goal in the next five months is to run sub 2:19,” Kirwa said. “I am excited because even though I didn’t meet my goal, I now know where I need to improve to reach it.”


Contents

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. [2]

Earlier legislation Edit

Lowering the minimum voting age was not a new idea. In the United States, some people started trying to get the voting age lowered during World War II. [3] During the war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt lowered the military draft age to 18. This meant that men as young as 18 could be forced to join the military. To many people, it did not seem fair that the government thought these young men were old enough to fight a world war, but not old enough to vote in the country they were fighting for. "Old enough to fight, old enough to vote" became a common slogan. [4]

United States Senator Harley Kilgore had begun supporting a lowered voting age in 1941. [3] Many other Senators, Representatives, and the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, supported the idea. [3] However, Congress never made any changes.

Kilgore's ideas did interest some of the states. In 1943, the Georgia state legislature passed a law lowering the voting age in the state to 18 in 1955, Kentucky did the same thing. [3]

In his State of the Union address in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first president to say publicly that he supported letting people ages 18 and older vote. [5]

In 1963, the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation made a report to President Lyndon B. Johnson. The report encouraged Johnson to lower the voting age. [6]

Support Edit

During the 1960s, many Americans pushed both Congress and the state legislatures to lower the minimum voting age from 21 to 18. This was mostly because of to the Vietnam War. As the war went on, more and more people started to protest the war and become active. [3] During that war, many young men were drafted and sent to fight in the war before they were old enough to vote. This meant they had no way to influence the people sending them off to risk their lives. Protesters started to use the slogan "Old enough to fight, old enough to vote" again.

Supporters also argued that the law treated eighteen-year-olds as adults in many other ways. For example, they had to pay income taxes. Supporters argued that this was "taxation without representation" – meaning that 18- to 20-year-olds had to pay taxes, but had no say in what those taxes were or what they were spent on, because they could not vote. [7]

In 1967, United States Representative William St. Onge pointed out: ""To tax our 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds without giving them the right to vote ignores the great rallying cry of our War of Independence that there [should] be 'no taxation without representation.'" [7]

Similarly, in 1970, in a committee that was debating a possible Constitutional amendment to lower the voting age, Representative Thomas Railsback said: ""Our laws tax these 18-year-olds but our voting laws do not permit them representation in enacting that tax law. The Boston Tea Party was supposed to have been the spark that put that issue to rest in this country." [7]

Opposition Edit

Not everybody supported lowering the minimum voting age. Opponents to giving younger people the vote had several arguments. Many argued that teenagers were not mature or responsible enough to vote. [8] [9] [10]

Other people argued that teenagers did not know enough to have the right to vote. One historian writes:

A former U.S. District Judge testified before Congress that, based on the results of quizzes and polling, teens [had] 'a [terrible] ignorance of even our own country's history, to say nothing of the history of the world. Anybody really qualified to exercise the right of suffrage ought to have a fair knowledge of the course of history.'" [4]

Others criticized the "old enough to fight, old enough to vote" argument. For example, in 1953, the popular magazine Collier's Weekly said this argument "doesn't justify giving young ladies of eighteen the right to franchise [vote]." They added: "If a man if old enough to vote when he's old enough to fight, then logically the man who is too old to fight out to lose the right to vote." [4]

Another example comes from an editorial written by the New York Times in 1967. The paper wrote: "The requirements for a good soldier and for a good voter are not the same. For the soldier, youthful enthusiasm and physical endurance are [of most] importance for the voter, maturity of judgment far outweighs other qualifications." [8]

Finally, some people thought lowering the voting age was not that important for the country, and that it should be left up to each individual state. [4]

Amending the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Edit

In 1970, United States Senators Ted Kennedy and Mike Mansfield suggested changing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to lower the voting age in the United States. [4]

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says that the government has to give every person "the equal protection of its laws." [1] People who supported the addition to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, like Ted Kennedy, said that by not allowing 18- to 20-year-olds to vote, the government not treating them equally by not letting them vote. [11]

President Nixon disagreed with Kennedy. He was not against lowering the voting age. However, he did not agree with Kennedy's legal argument. He also worried that if the Supreme Court thought the new Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional, they could overturn it – cancel the entire law. Nixon thought this could cause a lot of damage to the country. [12]

However, on June 22, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed an extension (an addition) to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The change required the voting age to be 18 in all federal, state, and local elections. [13] After signing the change, Nixon said:

Despite my [doubts] about the constitutionality of this one provision, I have signed the bill. I have directed the Attorney General to cooperate fully in expediting a swift court test of the constitutionality of the 18-year-old provision. [13]

After Nixon signed this change, about 17 states refused to change their minimum voting ages to 18. [3]

Oregon v. Mitchell Edit

After Nixon signed the change to the Voting Rights Act, Oregon and Texas challenged the law in court. The case, Oregon v. Mitchell, made it to the Supreme Court in October 1970. [14] This was just four months after Nixon signed the change. By this time, four states had lowered their minimum voting ages: Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska, and Hawaii. [15]

In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court looked at whether the voting age changes that Congress added to the Voting Rights Act were constitutional. This means they looked at whether the changes agreed with the rules in the Constitution, or broke them. The judges on the Supreme Court strongly disagreed with each other in this case. [16] Eventually, five out of the nine judges agreed on a decision - just enough to reach the majority needed for a decision. However, most of the judges did not agree on which legal reason was behind their decision. [16] [17]

The Court ruled that Congress could set a voting age for federal elections, but not state or local elections. [16] [17] This meant that for state and local elections, states could keep the voting age at 21 if they wanted to. However, they would have to keep two different voting registers (lists of people who had signed up to vote): one for federal elections, which would include people as young as 18, and another for state and local elections, which would only include people over age 20. [18]

After the Supreme Court's decision, both Congress and the states wanted to find a way to lower the minimum voting age throughout the country. Congress decided to propose a Constitutional amendment that would set the minimum voting age at 18 everywhere in the country. This would be different than the change to the Voting Rights Act in a few ways.

First of all, the states did not want to deal with the cost and difficulty of having to keep two different voting registers, so they supported the idea of a Constitutional amendment. [2] Also, when they changed the Voting Rights Act, Congress had made a law about state and local elections without the states having any say. However, for an amendment to be added to the Constitution, two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and then three-fourths of the state legislatures, have to agree on it. [a] [19] (These rules are set out in Article Five of the Constitution.) An amendment would be something that both Congress and the states agreed on. Congress would not be over-using its power and breaking the Constitution by making laws for the states.

Opinion polls said that most Americans wanted the Twenty-sixth Amendment to pass. Younger people were most likely to support the Amendment. However, even in people over age 50, over half of Americans supported the Amendment. [b] [20] Even the New York Times changed its official opinion and supported the Amendment. [21] [22] [23]

Approval by Congress Edit

On March 10, 1971, the United States Senate voted 94–0 in support of proposing an amendment that would lower the minimum voting age to 18 everywhere in the country. [24] On March 23, the United States House of Representatives voted 401–19 for the amendment. [24] Congress sent the amendment to the states.

Ratification Edit

For the Twenty-sixth Amendment to be added to the Constitution, three-fourths of the state legislatures (38 out of the 50) would have to ratify the Amendment. [19] It took just three months for 38 states to ratify the Amendment. After the Amendment was added to the Constitution, another five states ratified it. Seven states never did.

The states ratified the Amendment in this order: [25] [26]

Order State Date
1-5 Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, Tennessee, Washington March 23, 1971
6-7 Hawaii, Massachusetts March 24, 1971
8 Montana March 29, 1971
9-11 Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa March 30, 1971
12 Nebraska April 2, 1971
13 New Jersey April 3, 1971
14-15 Kansas, Michigan April 7, 1971
16-18 Alaska, Maryland, Indiana April 8, 1971
19 Maine April 9, 1971
20 Vermont April 16, 1971
21 Louisiana April 17, 1971
22 California April 19, 1971
23-25 Colorado, Pennsylvania, Texas April 27, 1971
26-27 South Carolina, West Virginia April 28, 1971
28 New Hampshire May 13, 1971
29 Arizona May 14, 1971
30 Rhode Island May 27, 1971
31 New York June 2, 1971
32 Oregon June 4, 1971
33 Missouri June 14, 1971
34 Wisconsin June 22, 1971
35 Illinois June 29, 1971
36-37 Alabama, Ohio June 30, 1971
38 North Carolina July 1, 1971
Amendment added to the Constitution: July 1, 1971
39 Oklahoma July 1, 1971
40-41 Virginia, Wyoming July 8, 1971
42 Georgia October 4, 1971
43 South Dakota March 4, 2014
Never voted on the Amendment
Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah

Ceremony Edit

On July 5, 1971, President Richard Nixon held a ceremony at the White House, where he signed the Twenty-sixth Amendment just to show his support. [27] (The President does not have to sign an amendment in order for it to be added to the Constitution. [19] ) During the signing ceremony, he talked about his confidence in the United States' young people:


Watch the video: Σταθερή η δέσμευση των ΗΠΑ στο Ιρακινό Κουρδιστάν (August 2022).